W ork. The modern fetish1. No previous age has been so enthralled2， or longed for more， rather than less， work to do. No other people have imagined nothing better for their posterity3 than the eternal creation of more work.
Work sits squarely at the center： the enduring economic imperative， political mandate，4 source of morality and social identity. Some have claimed that work has become the modern religion， answering what theologian Paul Tillich5 called the“existential questions” we all have as humans. Robert Hutchins6， legendary president of the University of Chicago， called the faith “salvation by work.”
However， as a faith， work is transient， based on a specific set of historical circumstances. Work may seem to be an eternal given， but what we experience as work is only a few centuries old； an emerging product of history， not an unchanging truth.
Of course， activities necessary to sustain life are fundamental. People have always had to eat. But work as we now understand it， as something abstract—independent of its particular forms （such as plowing， building， trading）—has a modern origin. Hunter-gatherer people had no such general word.
For most of written history， jobs as we know them as a place to go to， away from home and separate from ordinary life， were rare； aspirations， success， meaning， purpose， and identity were found largely in traditions and faiths. It is only with the coming of the Industrial Revolution that work as we now understand it emerged， defined by specific modern characteristics such as being hired and paid， resulting in clear， and now fundamental， divisions of work and life.
Not only is this work a recent accident of history， it is flimsy7 and fragile. Our belief in the everlasting creation of new work to sustain eternal full-time， full employment is one of history’s all-time， fantastic utopian8 dreams. Even the short-term looks increasingly bleak.
Assurances that new work will automatically be created as economies grow are less and less convincing with the approach of a new wave of computers， robots， drones and self-driving vehicles. Few doubt that the vast majority of current jobs that involve doing the same things over and over will soon be replaced by computer algorithms.
More important， work is failing as a faith. Millennials depend less and less on their jobs as the place to realize their dreams， having found the overblown promises of work empty.9 According to a 2014 Harris poll， nearly 70 percent of U.S. employees are not “involved in， enthusiastic about or committed to their work.”
It’s not just millennials. Many others feel “betrayed by work，” having made it the centerpiece of their lives and a key source of happiness only to realize how dispensable10 they are when things go wrong， for example if they are passed over for promotion， sidelined or laid off.
People are turning to other， non-earning sources of fulfillment： volunteering， spiritual explorations， relationships， and to alternative venues such as their homes， community spaces or clubs for social and even economic exchanges. Writing in The New York Times， columnist David Brooks describes a shift of values from consumerism and ownership to experiences， a process that is giving life to the burgeoning “experience economy.” Research from McKinsey found that over the past few years spending on experiences—such as eating out and traveling—had grown nearly four times faster than spending on goods.
The prospect of any religion’s failure is an awful thing for its devotees. Unlike most human beings through history， most of us have no idea that there may be life beyond work. We are unable to imagine， much less believe in an alternative.
There are， however， plenty of alternatives to work that are both more realistic and reliable. I have spent a good deal of my life trying to write a history of labor’s century-long fight for progressively shorter work hours， and the accompanying dream of what Walt Whitman11 called the “higher progress.”This was once the confident expectation that economic progress was paving the way to humane and moral progress. After providing for the material necessities of life， technology would free us， increasingly， for better things. Eventually we would have plenty of time for family， friends， beauty， joy， creativity， God and nature.
It seems unlikely that the U.S. government will lead the way； legislation providing a guaranteed annual income or limiting work hours seems exceedingly unlikely. What is more likely is that ordinary people， finding better things to do with their lives， will shorten their work hours on their own when they are able to afford it， gradually choosing to “buy back”their lives.
The results of the return of progressively shorter hours would be dramatic. Economists such as Monsignor12 John Ryan reasoned that progressively shorter hours will act to redistribute wealth—value now in the form of capital will gradually flow back to ordinary people in the form of time. We all might reclaim ownership over more of our lives instead of continuing in thrall13， sacrificing our lives for the profit of the ultra-rich. In this opening realm of freedom， equality might also be within reach； we all have the same amount of hours to live each day.
It would be reckless14 to predict a world entirely without work. However， it is reasonable to expect that work will eventually return to its historical set-point as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Work can be tamed， and made more of an adornment to life rather than its center. And the forgotten American dream of “higher progress”may be reawakened.
作业。這一现代的嗜好。曩昔没有哪个时代如此痴迷或许巴望更多而非更少的作业。所有人都以为对子孙子孙而言没有什么是比连绵不断发明出更多作业更好的作业。
作业正坐中心：它是持续的经济需求、政治授权、品德与社会身份的来历。有些人宣称作业现已成为了仅有的现代宗教，答复了神学家保罗·田立克所说的咱们生而为人都会有的“存在主义问题”。芝加哥大学传奇校长罗伯特·哈钦斯称这种崇奉为“经过作业取得救赎”。
但是，作为一种崇奉，作业是转瞬即逝的，依据一组特定的前史环境。作业或许好像天经地义是永久的，但咱们所阅历的作业只要几个世纪的前史，是一种才呈现没多久的前史产品，而非一种永久不变的真理。
当然，保持日子所必需的活动是底子的。人类有必要一向有东西吃。但咱们现在所了解的作业，作为某种笼统的东西——无所谓特定方式（比方耕耘、修建、买卖）——起源自现代。原始社会依托打猎和收集日子的人类并没有这样广泛的词汇。
在有文字记载的前史上的大部分时刻里，作为某个需求前往的、远离家的地址，与日常日子所分离隔，这种咱们所了解的作业是很少见的；巴望、成功、含义、意图和身份首要来自传统和崇奉。直到工业革命降临，咱们现在所了解的作业才开端呈现，这种作业被例如雇佣和薪水等详细的现代特征所界说，然后导致作业和日子呈现清晰的——现在底子的——区别。
这种作业不仅是前史上较近呈现的意外，而且软弱、易碎。咱们深信能够连绵不断发明出新的作业来保持永久的全职充分就业是前史上空前的不切实践的乌托邦愿望之一。即便短期看起来也越来越昏暗。
跟着经济的开展，新作业会主动被发明出来，而跟着新一波计算机、机器人、无人机和主动驾驶轿车的呈现，这样的保证越来越不可信。很少有人会置疑绝大多数现有的重复性作业很快就会被计算机算法所代替。
更重要的是，作业作为一种崇奉正在走向失利。千禧一代越来越不依托作业来完成愿望，他们现已发现夸张作业的报答是多么空泛。依据2014年哈里斯民意调查，近70%的美国职工对自己的作业并没有感到“融入、热忱或许投入。”
不仅仅是千禧一代。其他人中也有许多觉得“被作业变节”，他们从前将作业视为日子的中心和夸姣的要害来历，但是一旦呈现了问题，比方他们得不到提升、被边缘化或许被裁掉时，才意识到作业是多么不必要。
人们正在转向其他不挣钱的作业来完成人生价值：自愿服务、精力探究、人际关系，而且转向其他代替性场所，比方家庭、社区空间或沙龙来进行交际甚至经济买卖。专栏作家大卫·布鲁克斯在《纽约时报》上撰文描绘了价值观从消费主义和所有权向体会改变，这一进程为蓬勃开展的“体会经济”注入了活力。麦肯锡的研讨发现：在曩昔几年，在体会上的花销，比方外出就餐和游览，比在产品上的花销增加快三倍。
任何宗教失利的远景对其信徒来说都是很糟糕的作业。与前史上的大多数人不同，咱们大多数人并不知道或许会有作业之外的日子。咱们无法幻想，更不用说信任存在另一种挑选。
但是，有许多能够代替作业的挑选愈加实践、牢靠。我花了很多时刻企图书写劳工长达一个世纪的奋斗史，他们为了逐步缩短作业时刻，为了随之而来的沃尔特·惠特曼称之为“更高前进”的愿望而不断奋斗。人们从前决心满满地等待经济前进为人道和品德的前进铺平道路。在为日子供给物质方面的必需品之后，技能会将咱们解放，让咱们寻求更夸姣的东西。终究，咱们将有足够的时刻奉献给家人、朋友、美丽、高兴、发明、天主和天然。
美国政府好像不大或许在这方面带头；经过立法来保证必定的年收入或许约束作业时刻好像彻底不或许。但更或许发生的是一般群众找到了生射中更好的作业后，在有才能承当时，他们会自行缩短作业时刻，逐步挑选“回购”自己的日子。
逐步缩短作业时刻的报答所带来的成果将是巨大的。经济学家如约翰·赖安尊下揣度，逐步缩短作业时刻会从头分配财富——当时以本钱方式存在的价值将逐步以时刻的方式流回一般百姓。
咱们都或许从头取得对咱们更多日子的所有权，而不是持续受制于人，为了超级有钱人的赢利而献上咱们的生命。在这个日益敞开的自在范畴里，相等或许也触手可得；咱们每个人都有相同数量的时刻来过好每天的日子。
料想一个彻底没有作业的国际或许有些不切实践。但是，希望作业终究会回到其前史设定点——即作为到达意图的手法而非意图自身——是合理的。作业能够被征服，而且更多地成为日子的装饰品而非中心。被忘记的“更高前进”的美国梦或许会被从头唤醒。
1. fetish： 痴迷，恋物癖。
2. enthrall： // 迷住，吸引住。
3. posterity： 子孙。
